China entails enhancing the social and political status of a new moneyed urban middle class, particularly white-collar professionals and private entrepreneurs. In many ways, this strategy has been remarkably successful. In contrast to urban young people of the 1980s, who were often "searching for life's meaning", contemporary youth are success-oriented and openly seek "the good life". The following pages will examine the effects on popular attitudes of the regime's emphasis on performance and material success as a source of statusincluding the acceptance of growing social stratification. I will argue that "value", in a material sense, has become a key indicator of worth. Thus, as will be seen, In previous work I have focused more on the contradictions and tensions between international influences, pragmatism and the rise of popular nationalism among Chinese youth. While rising nationalism remains an important element in the attitudes and behavior of youth, and serves as a potential threat to the regime, the argument here is that pragmatism and the pursuit of the good life has made popular nationalism, at least in the short term, less of a threat.
new stratification patterns, usually with an emphasis on the incomes and lifestyles of the wealthiest strata and individuals. 5 Some scholars, having conducted content analyses of the media, have railed against the extensive coverage of CEOs and general managers of companies on the one hand, and film stars, singers, and sports stars on the other, with an almost complete lack of concern for the common people. 6 Some prominent Chinese sociologists and social critics have gone further, warning that increasing inequalities and skewed patterns of stratification have already begun to produce a "fractured" (duanlie)
society, in which people in the same country live in different technological ages. This open discussion of stratification patterns, which now includes an authoritative list of the different strata making up Chinese society and their characteristics, has been reflected in the more openly expressed attitudes and behavior of upwardly mobile Chinese youth. As I will show below, in key areas of political and social life, such as recruitment into the Party, finding a job, obtaining and valuing wealth, choosing schools and so forth, youth have become less reluctant to openly acknowledge that instrumental, success-oriented values take precedence. Although the reality is of course more complex, and "nationalistic" impulses will rise to the forefront when it is perceived that China is insulted or threatened, it seems clear that professional and economic concerns are paramount. Only a small number of many similar published studies will be mentioned. See, for example, the cover story and the survey of seven cities entitled "Qian shi shenma?"
(What Is Money?), Xin zhou kan (New Weekly), 15 September 1999, pp. 52-7.
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THE CHINA JOURNAL NO. 51 the third choice was to be a provincial or municipal leader. 10 In feature films as well, the importance of money in governing interactions, even in the most backward rural areas of China, has become a major and, at times, comical theme.
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The media have played their part in legitimating wealth as a highly positive value, often lionizing the country's wealthiest citizens. One recent book profiles the 50 richest people in China. 12 One of the most widely circulated popular magazines devoted a cover story and lengthy articles to the report of the first official survey of the richest individuals in ten provinces, with details on age, educational background, annual income, investment strategies, professions, and so forth. 13 Another popular magazine provided thumbnail sketches of the ten best "professions" in which to make money and contrasted them with those in China Indeed, the treatment of the rich in the Chinese media has become a contentious issue. In early 2003, after three leading private entrepreneurs were murdered within three weeks of each other, and the media began to speculate on "revenge against the rich" and "politics among the rich" as motives, as well as whether the government should provide "special protection" to the newly rich, the internal journal of the Central Committee's Propaganda Department, acknowledging the glaring inequalities still existing in China, suggested that such reporting was damaging to social stability. The media were urged instead to offer positive accounts, for example cases of how the newly rich were aiding the poor to become rich themselves.
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Even in youth magazines intended as socialization agents for high school students, the subject of money-and how to make it-is common. Shandong
Youth organized a discussion forum in February 2002 entitled, "Men, Women and Money", in which students were asked the different means by which men and women could make money, and the relationship between money and bad and three on the list a year earlier, were left off in 2002. The first Yang has been under house arrest on charges of tax evasion and the second has fled to the U.S. to avoid charges of illegal economic activities. defined by society. But the book sold only 20,000 copies, and he was roundly vilified by parents and educators.
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As parents strive to manoeuvre their children successfully up through the ladder of education and, through this, into secure high-paying jobs, an extensive use of money has penetrated the educational system at every level, from kindergarten on through the PhD. The government has encouraged this.
Universities were given the right to determine their own fee structure in 1992, and in 1993 the government issued a major policy document stating that higher education should move gradually from a system under which the government guaranteed education and employment to a system in which students were held responsible for both. As a result, fewer academically qualified students from nonprosperous homes were admitted. Tuition costs today vary widely depending on location, specialization, whether or not the student is in a degree program, and so forth. But a common factor has been the increasing rise in the fees. category. For those that charge by the year, the range was between 2,000 and 7,000 yuan, with the majority charging between 4,000-5,000 yuan.
28
The fee structure has been complicated by the move to "expanded enrollment" in 1999, offering the universities new opportunities to generate income, while creating different "strata" among the students. Thus, students in the same year and specialization at the same university often find themselves In light of this fee system, it is no surprise that there are cautionary tales of swindlers preying on parents desperate to find university places for their children.
One exposé published in a widely circulated youth magazine under the title, if China admits 2,000 MBA students every year, it will take 170 years to meet today's needs".
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In a further example of the commercialization of education, even to discover the annual results on the all-important university entrance examination is getting expensive. Until recently all it took was thirty fen (about 4 cents) to buy a newspaper or two or three yuan to make a phone call to discover provincial examination scores. In 2001, however, to the great consternation of nervous students and parents, the system in Guangxi Province was changed and individuals were now required to buy a special "Golden Number One Scholar
Card" for 40 yuan from the Guangxi Branch of the Agricultural Bank of China to access these scores. The bank, having purchased the information from the Guangxi District University Recruitment and Examination Office for as much as 800,000 yuan, was given the exclusive rights to release it. 39 The situation is similar in many other provinces.
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In the past, the standard route to success for the brightest and most ambitious students included entrance to a key high school (and perhaps a key primary school as well), followed by entrance to a key university. Upon graduation the fortunate student would be allocated a job in the state sector of the economy in a major city and spend the rest of his/her life with an "iron rice bowl". In recent years, because of the differential effects of economic reforms on different localities, there is no longer a "standard route" up the educational ladder. The diversity of the educational system has required parents and students to formulate diverse strategies depending on the locality. For example, in less developed areas of the country the most intense competition is often over entrance to a technical school, not a key academic high school that prepares the student for university.
Since only a small number will go on to university anyway-and university tuition has become prohibitive for many families-it is much more practical to seek education which ensures employment, and to do so as early in one's educational career as possible. 41 Indeed, one survey of junior high students and their parents in the rural areas of Hunan Province found that students were dropping out in large numbers because of a lack of family finances, and that 65
per cent saw migrant labour, not further study, as their "ideal career choice". In large cities like Beijing, by contrast, the competition to enter the best schools is intense at the lower levels, which are popularly seen as essential stepping stones into the most prestigious universities and professions. The government has sought, through public policy, to reduce the competitive fires by abolishing key schools below the senior high school level and compelling parents to send their children to primary and junior high schools based on neighbourhood patterns. But particularly since 1993, there has been a virtually complete flouting of the law. 43 Parents have been able to use power, connections or money to get their children into schools beyond the neighbourhood catchments. Indeed, by the mid-1990s, in elite junior high schools in Beijing such "school-selecting students" (zexiao xuesheng) often accounted for more than 50 per cent of enrollments, and the phenomenon had also spread to lower-ranked schools.
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In the intervening years, money in the form of "tuition donations" has become the standard method-and often the only way-for parents to get their children into the schools of their choice. Tuition costs vary considerably depending on a student's marks, the quality of the school, the connections the parents have to a school, and so forth. In the mid-1990s these costs ranged from 43 Rosen, "Education and Economic Reform", pp. 256-9. The growing inequalities in basic education and the resultant phenomenon of "selecting schools" is now so widespread that it is openly discussed in academic journals and the popular press. In addition to extensive surveys reporting on the inequalities, the costs of selecting schools in various cities have been regularized-and published-to make it easier for parents to calculate educational expenses. Parents know, though, that schools routinely ask for far more than the published fee. In Taiyuan, Shanxi Province, the Provincial
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The problems relating to the use of money in the educational system are frequently addressed in the Chinese press, and include criticism of the new elite private schools set up for the nouveaux riches, as well as the efforts of public schools to emulate them by "collecting fees at random".
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Education Commission has sought to guarantee that every primary school graduate can get a free junior high education at their neighbourhood school. In reality, fewer than 10 per cent are able to do so. 49 At some of the best primary schools in Guangzhou, only half the students in some classrooms come from the neighbourhood. 50 With expanded enrollment also occurring at lower levels, key primary and secondary schools may recruit a few classes of top-notch students and fill the remaining classes with students paying high fees. Elitist educators have been concerned that the distinction between the quality of students at the key and ordinary schools has become blurred.
51
In less developed western China, which has been under pressure to achieve nine year compulsory education and provide more educational opportunities for rural youth, an intriguing pattern has developed in which the educational authorities meet their responsibilities, while still disadvantaging the rural areas and the urban poor. Chongqing is a particularly interesting and well-publicized case, attracting attention because of the city's high rate of promotion from senior high to university. placing the large majority in the main centers of the city. Thus, most districts and counties had only one or two senior highs. Chongqing had expanded schooling at the lower levels, but then closed it off for most beyond junior high. 52 Such limited opportunities fueled the competition to enter even lesser quality senior highs, with each school setting high entry charges.
At an elite first-category school in the city, the starting price (in the form of a "contribution" or "public construction" fee) is 40,000 yuan; for those with scores on the municipal entrance examination below 490 points, an additional 5,000
yuan must be added for each ten points. At Chongqing No. 7 High School, a category 2 school, the starting price is 16,000 yuan; for each point below the required admission score the applicant must add 100 yuan. Lower quality schools require lower fees. For example, the starting price for Nanping High is 9,500 yuan, with an additional 80 yuan required for each point below its admission requirements. is compelled to make a large number of phone calls, hence the purchase of a cell phone, and to send many faxes. It is not uncommon to put together a "booklet" advertising one's skills. One informant who is a graduate from a non-key university, fearing that she would not be competitive, put together 20 résumé booklets with each page made from expensive art paper, at a cost of 3,000 yuan.
Indeed, the Chinese press reports that 2,000-3,000 yuan is the average expense for college graduates looking for employment. 54 Some applicants, seeking to make a good impression, purchase expensive leather briefcases, showing their "professionalism". Since everyone wants a job in a big city such as Shanghai or Shenzhen, frequent trips to be interviewed may also be required (add several thousand more yuan). As one popular magazine noted in describing this scenario, "this kind of expense by graduates seeking jobs is common and represents only the middle level of expense".
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Given the pervasiveness of money throughout the educational system, from gaining admission to finding employment, it is perhaps not surprising that within the schools and universities money has entered student politics as well. Even to win office as a student cadre in college now requires some expense, first to invite the relevant people to lunch or dinner in pushing your candidacy, and then to hold a celebration after being elected. Moreover, it is not uncommon to offer gifts or even cash to classmates in seeking their vote. To take one reported case in which there were 500 potential voters, the candidate spent an average of 30 yuan per person to ensure 100 votes, for a cost of 3,000 yuan. As he put it, spending that amount of money to become a chair or vice-chair really isn't very much.
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While some university students are willing to pay to become "officials"-it looks good on one's résumé when applying for a job-at the lower levels it is often difficult to find people to take on what are generally perceived to be unrewarding and unrewarded tasks. When a minban (non-government-run) school in Henan Province began to provide remuneration to students from fourth year of primary school through junior high school to encourage students to take on student officer roles-offering from 5 yuan to 45 yuan a month depending on performance-it led to a debate in educational circles on whether such material incentives were appropriate. More traditional educators felt that student cadres were learning valuable organizational and leadership skills, such as public speaking, so payment was unnecessary and even counterproductive. One leading educator noted that the development of the market economy was an assault on the between Party membership and employment prospects. One university surveyed
Party members who were students or intellectuals and discovered that close to half of them had joined because it would help them find a good job. 69 A very popular slogan among them was: "Before you enter the Party you're sweating all over; after you enter the Party you can relax. Before you enter the Party you're full of revolution; after you enter the Party you meld into the crowd". 70 According to this report, Party membership was also popular because foreign invested companies sought out such individuals to recruit. They reasoned that students who had joined the Party must have been on good terms with their instructors, which meant they were likely to be compatible as employees. Such companies also liked to recruit student cadres because it was felt that they had some organizational skills.
One imaginative study surveyed newly graduated students who had already signed employment contracts with their work units, and recent graduates with 69 Another survey found that when university students who had already joined were asked why they sought membership, 30 per cent admitted that it would enable them to find a good job after graduation. They were also asked their opinion of the following statement: "Entering the Party is a bargaining chip that can increase one's chances in the competition to find a good job". 70 per cent chose the response, "It's not completely accurate, but it's definitely reasonable to think that". Pan Duola, "Ye tan 'ru dang dongji'" (More on 'Motivations for Joining the Party'), Nanfang zhoumo (Southern Weekend), 27 September 1996. The opening salvo in the discussion was an open letter to the magazine from "Young Bo", in which he described the history of his relationship with his closest friend, Li Xijun, from his senior year in high school in Gansu Province. Even after Bo was accepted at a key university in Xi'an and his classmate failed the university entrance examination, the two friends swore that they would remain like brothers for the rest of their lives. After graduation Bo was able to find a good job in Beijing but his friend remained at home as an ordinary worker.
Inviting Li to Beijing and sneaking him in to live in the work unit's housing, they tried several ways to arrange for Li to find a steady job in the city, including an unsuccessful attempt to purchase a bogus college degree. that individuals from different strata were no longer able to exchange thoughts and feelings successfully. As they are no longer classmates and in effect have no common interests or topics to share and discuss, the friendship must end. At best they should cherish the memory of this formerly close friendship. A middle school teacher, for example, felt that he could not have any relationship with a member of the nouveaux riches.
One participant in the discussion, a reporter for a Beijing newspaper, offered a particularly graphic response in arguing against friendships across widely divergent socio-economic strata, "at least in today's China", as he put it. He noted that a newspaper in Qingdao had reported that some people proposed that a separate section of public transportation be set aside for migrant workers (min gong) on the grounds that "neat and tidy" urban residents could not tolerate the smell of these outsiders. This proposal, he felt, suggested that China was becoming worse than the United States in terms of discrimination. If people feel this way, how could one possibly make friends with these migrants? He also noted that many of his friends felt they could have cross-strata friendships, until he pressed them and then they changed their minds. In an exchange with a chat room friend who felt that he could be friends with a migrant worker, the reporter responded: "I don't believe you! Do you mean you wouldn't be put off by the bad body odor, the shabby clothes, or the diminished image you would have walking next to such a person?" The chat room friend reluctantly agreed, suggesting that not only couldn't he be friends with a migrant worker, but that if his classmates or friends dressed badly or smelled badly, he wouldn't spend time with them either.
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Those more optimistic agreed that the major impediment to friendship was China's increasing stratification, but they felt that a person should not be bound by social role and status. With sincerity and enthusiasm, individuals could transcend social distinctions. It was important to recognize of course that social roles are changing and that this will require a reassessment of the relationships one has, but for a psychologically healthy person there should be a rational way to solve these problems without abandoning former friends (there seemed much less likelihood of making new friends across strata).
Indeed, there is a saying that students on university campuses are divided into "five big tribes" (wu da buluo), based on wealth, consumption patterns, and housing. The poorest students live in shabby dorms; the richest students occupy the new apartments on campus. As one student told a China Youth Daily reporter, "We only hang out with friends in our circle. If a member of our group went looking for romance with an apartment dweller, s(he) would be mocked for "trying to climb above their station" (pan gao zhi).
79

Conclusion
China has begun to produce an upwardly mobile white-collar stratum of yuppies, a status that other urban people openly aspire to. Surveys have revealed important distinctions that differentiate this upwardly mobile and materialisticallymotivated group in areas such as values and friendships.
The path to upward mobility is becoming increasingly skewed by the triumph of the new money-driven values and practices. In the past, education had been relatively inexpensive, and talented young people and their parents had reason to hope that diligence would be rewarded with good prospects for upward mobility, even for the poor. However, changing public policies and the differential effects of the economic reforms mean that today parents with the ability to pay can virtually ensure places for their children in elite schools; and graduates must be entrepreneurial in tracking down good jobs. Those without money and connections have found it difficult to compete. represents the advanced productive forces (i.e., the growing upper middle class), the promotion of advanced culture (in contrast to rampant materialism, as well as "feudal" culture), and the interests of the majority of the Chinese people. This "Three Represents" theme has been associated with and used to justify the recruitment of private entrepreneurs into the Party. 83 Thus, rather than tempering materialistic pursuits, the "three represents" initiative is far more likely to exacerbate them, while further calling attention to the gulf between a "communist" Party and the increasingly capitalistic economic order. So long as the economy continues to grow at a reasonably high rate the disjuncture between politics and economics and state and society is not likely to produce an unmanageable crisis for the regime in the near term. In the long run, however, there are obvious dangers if the Party increasingly embraces money-making elites 82 yet is unable to harness the focus on materialist values to a new and acceptable moral discourse.
